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Sammendrag 
I denne studien analyserer vi hvordan direkte og indirekte miljøreguleringer påvirker bedriftenes 
miljøatferd, målt som endringer i utslippsintensitet. Vi tester også i hvilken grad endringer i 
utslippsintensiteten er varig eller kun midlertidig, dersom miljøreguleringen blir mindre streng. 
Tradisjonell økonomisk teori fremholder at indirekte reguleringer som avgifter og omsettelige 
utslippskvoter gir lavere marginal rensekostnad. Indirekte reguleringer gir ifølge litteraturen også 
insentiver til varige utslippsreduksjoner, ofte i form av at ny, miljøvennlig teknologi tas i bruk. Direkte 
reguleringer som teknologistandarder og ikke-omsettelige utslippskvoter, hevdes ikke å gi slike varige 
insentiver til ytterligere utslippsreduksjoner som følge av at det ikke er noen pris på det marginale 
utslippet. Indirekte reguleringer blir ofte karakterisert som “insentiv-baserte”, mens direkte 
reguleringer ofte blir oppfattet som “påbud/forbud”. En slik kategorisering kan være misvisende siden 
direkte reguleringer i mange tilfeller stiller bedriftene overfor sterke insentiver til utslippsreduksjoner, 
både knyttet til hvordan reguleringen er utformet og om det er mulig å utnytte umodne markeder for 
nye miljøteknologier.  
 
Indirekte reguleringer som miljøavgifter fører til at kostnadene ved å bruke forurensende 
innsatsfaktorer øker relativt til andre innsatsfaktorer. Bruken av forurensende innsatsfaktorer vil da 
reduseres, både som følge av at forurensende innsatsfaktorer vil substitueres mot rene, og at 
produksjonen kan falle. Direkte reguleringer pålegges av Miljødirektoratet og innebærer kostnader 
som påvirker produksjonsaktiviteten til bedriftene. Disse insentivene kommer i form av trusler om 
sanksjoner. Bedriftene kan ilegges bøter dersom de avviker fra reguleringen, og utslippstillatelsen kan 
trekkes tilbake – som kan føre til at bedriften må stenge. Det kan også gi bedriftene kostnader i form 
av dårlig rykte og lokal stigma dersom avvik offentliggjøres. Disse insentivene skiller seg ikke 
vesentlig fra prisinsentivene som indirekte reguleringer gir. 
 
Vår analyse tar i bruk et paneldatasett på bedriftsnivå som inkluderer direkte og indirekte 
miljøreguleringer, utslipp av 260 ulike typer forurensende kilder (som gir opphav til ulike typer 
skader), estimerte skadekostnader, energibruk og priser, i tillegg til detaljert regnskapsstatistikk og 
energistatistikk. Vi identifiserer positive og signifikante effekter på utslippsintensitet av både direkte 
og indirekte reguleringer. Trusler om sanksjoner fra direkte regulering, og økt relativ pris på skitne i 
forhold til rene innsatsfaktorer gjennom indirekte reguleringer, gir insentiver til reduksjoner i 
utslippsintensitet. Videre finner vi finner at direkte reguleringer fører til varige effekter på 
utslippsintensitet i motsetning til antakelser i litteraturen. Indirekte reguleringer vil derimot kun ha 
potensielle varige effekter dersom avgiftsnivået opprettholdes eller øker over tid. 
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1 Introduction
Environmental regulations are used to internalize external costs stemming from
various forms of pollution. To be eﬀective, such regulations must alter the costs
of production (Lucas et al., 1992). Regulatory costs can create an incentive to
reduce the production activity level, make the production process less polluting
by purchasing or developing more eﬃcient technology, or substituting dirty input
factors with cleaner alternatives.
During the last decades, environmental concerns have gained increased atten-
tion in both developing and developed economies. Diﬀerent kinds of environ-
mental regulations have been introduced in order to curb pollution emissions to
air, soil and water. The regulations have been many-sided ranging from strict
direct pollution regulations (command-and-control) as technology standards and
non-tradable emission quotas, to indirect (incentive-based) regulations such as
environmental taxes and tradable emission quotas.1
Conventional economic theory predicts two main advantages of indirect regu-
lations over direct regulations. First of all, indirect policy instruments provide the
more cost-eﬃcient emission reductions2 (Stavins, 2001; Tietenberg, 1990; Newell
and Stavins, 2003; Perman et al., 2011; Keohane et al., 1998, Maloney and Yandle,
1984). Numerical simulation experiments conﬁrm that the costs of direct regu-
lations may be considerable (Perman et al., 2011) although this is not conﬁrmed
by empirical studies (Cole and Grossman, 1999). Secondly, the literature predicts
that indirect regulations promote continuous dynamic incentives by providing
permanent incentives for reducing emissions through technological improvement,
in contrast to direct regulation (Jaﬀe and Stavins, 1995; OECD, 2001; Perman et
al., 2011). A ﬁrm facing indirect regulations such as tradable quotas or an emis-
sion tax will generate dynamic gains through responses over time to its incentives
if the taxes remain constant or increase over time. The incentive structure will
stimulate continuous environmental technological improvements. On the other
hand, direct regulations may be characterized by a binary switch, as the required
target is reached, but the literature suggests that there are no incentives for further
technological improvements.
Other studies illustrate how the dualistic categorization of instruments as
1 Heine et al. (2012) is a recent contribution that summarizes principles and practices of
environmental tax reforms that also includes administrative and direct regulations.
2 For a ﬂow pollutant or a uniform-mixed stock pollutant, Perman et al. (2011).
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incentive-based or command-and-control is misleading (see e.g., Bohm and Rus-
sel, 1985). Although we ﬁnd no studies that empirically investigate the persis-
tent eﬀects of regulations on environmental performance, some studies state that
the diﬀerences between these types of instruments are typically over-emphasized
(Cole and Grossman, 1999) as there are several incentives arising from direct
forms of regulations that are not fundamentally diﬀerent from those arising from
taxes and tradable quotas. This is also evident from empirical analyzes, see e.g.,
Cole et al. (2005) and Féres and Reynaud (2012). Studies typically focus on
the evaluation criteria economic eﬃciency (a policy's aggregate net beneﬁts) and
cost-eﬀectiveness (Goulder and Parry, 2008). No single policy instrument ranks
ﬁrst along all the dimensions of policy comparison (Palmer, 1980; Goulder and
Parry, 2008; Perman et al., 2011; Wiener, 1999). A natural but quite unexplored
criterion is environmental performance, measured as an emission intensity.
In this paper we analyse the eﬀects of alternative policy instruments on en-
vironmental performance, measured as an emission intensity, and especially in-
vestigate whether we can empirically identify signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
eﬀects of direct and indirect regulations on environmental performance, using a
ﬁrm level data set. In particular, we test the notion from literature that indi-
rect regulations promote continuous dynamic incentives that lead to persistent
eﬀects on emissions through technological improvement, in contrast to direct reg-
ulations. Our unique ﬁrm-level data set allows us to analyze the eﬀects from
diﬀerent types of regulations such as environmental taxes, non-tradable emission
quotas and technology standards. We investigate whether any of these regulations
promote continuous dynamic incentives (leading to persistent eﬀects) through an
asymmetry test with regard to the ﬁrms' responses to stricter versus more lax
regulations.
Our extensive Norwegian ﬁrm level panel data set over the years 1993-2012
includes information about diﬀerent types of environmental regulations, the total
range of Norwegian ﬁrms' land based pollutant emissions (more than 260 diﬀerent
pollutants), and a large number of control variables including key economic vari-
ables for all polluting Norwegian incorporated ﬁrms. We use the detailed emissions
data in combination with weighted damage cost estimates of the emissions from
the Shadow Prices Handbook (de Bruin et al., 2010)3 and Norwegian damage esti-
3 The Shadow Prices handbook (de Bruin et al., 2010) is developed by CE Delft, an indepen-
dent research and consultancy organization. The Handbook is available at the homepage of CE
Delft. We use the damage estimates for a large share of the several hundred substances listed
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mates whenever these exist (Håndbok V712, 2006; Rosendahl, 2000), to calculate
monetary estimates of the emission damages. These monetary estimates allow us
to include and compare the whole range of emissions such as heavy metals, partic-
ulates, acidiﬁcation and ozone precursors, and green house gases. The pollutants
cause diﬀerent types of damages, ranging from cancer risks or loss of fertility to
global warming. We use these monetary estimates of costs of emissions to measure
environmental performance. We are thus able to conduct a study of the eﬀects
of various environmental regulations on a measure of environmental performance
that includes all types of emissions. Including all types of emissions is particularly
vital in a study of direct regulations, as emissions other than green house gases
are still often regulated through technology standards and non-tradable emission
quotas. Our ﬁrm-level panel data set also contains information about diﬀerent
types of environmental regulations as tradable and non-tradable emission quotas,
technology restrictions and environmental taxes.
We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, the large scale
of diﬀerent types of emissions in our data enables us to perform a comprehensive
study of the eﬀects of the various environmental policy instruments that has been
used. Secondly, our data allow us to test an important assumption from literature
(untested at the ﬁrm level), namely that only indirect regulations provide con-
tinuous dynamic incentives for emission reductions leading to persistent eﬀects.
Thirdly, we include a large set of control variables that are likely to inﬂuence emis-
sions' performance. We control for economic eﬀects as scale eﬀects (size measured
by the number of employees), technology eﬀects (capital intensity measured as
capital stock divided with the number of employees), and for whether the ﬁrm is
included in the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS). The only
study we ﬁnd that analyses eﬀects of regulations on environmental performance,
Féres and Reynaud (2012), analyze the impact of formal regulations (direct) and
informal (community pressure, etc.) regulations on environmental and economic
performance of a regional group of Brazilian manufacturing ﬁrms, but their formal
regulations do not include what we denote as indirect regulations.
In line with Cole et al. (2005) and Féres and Reynaud (2012)  among oth-
in Tables 50 (Damage costs for emissions to air) and 52 (Damage costs for emissions to water)
in the Annexes of this report. The damage costs for emissions to air are obtained using NEEDS
damage costs. The NEEDS project is an ExternErelated European study on the external costs
of energy use, completed in 2008. The damage costs for emissions to water are obtained using
direct valuation of ReCiPe endpoint characterization factors. Since this method is a less reliable
method than using NEEDS damage costs, damage estimates to water are only approximate.
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ers, we identify a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of non-tradable emission quotas
and technology standards on environmental performance. Moreover, we ﬁnd pos-
itive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of environmental taxes proxied as the relative price
between dirty intermediary inputs and clean energy inputs. We also ﬁnd evidence
that direct regulations promote continuous dynamic incentives that lead to persis-
tent eﬀects, in contrast to what is suggested by the literature (Jaﬀe and Stavins,
1995; OECD, 2001; Perman et al., 2011). Our results indicate that the dualistic
categorization of the instruments as either incentive-based or command-and-
control is overly simplistic, and that the notion from literature that only indirect
regulations promote continuous dynamic incentives does not hold, as we identify
persistent eﬀects from direct regulations. Indirect regulations will, on the other
hand, only have potential persistent eﬀects if environmental taxes are increasing
over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A theoretical motivation for
our econometric model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 contains a description
of the data, while the econometric model and results are presented in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes and suggests some policy implications.
2 A production function with clean and dirty inputs
In order to identify eﬀects of the diﬀerent regulations on environmental perfor-
mance, we need a ﬂexible production function. Polluting emissions are (mostly)
related to input of materials for the production processes and use of dirty energy.
Therefore, we speciﬁy a production function that includes clean and dirty inputs.
Whereas labor L, capital K and renewable energy are examples of clean inputs,
oil products and dirty materials, as choke and coal are examples of dirty inputs.
Assume that we have two types of intermediary inputs; clean inputs, Z1, and dirty
inputs, Z2, which are imperfect substitutes, and that the production function is
separable in (Z1,Z2) and (L,K) as follows:
Qit = f
(
Kit, Lit,
[
Zδ1it + (b2itZ2it)
δ
] 1
δ
)
, (1)
where Qit is output, and total intermediary input is a Constant Eleasticity of
Substitution (CES) aggregate of Z1 and Z2, where Z1 is the numeraire input
(with b1it = 1) and the parameter b2it determines the eﬃciency of input factor 2
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(dirty intermediary inputs) relative to factor 1 (clean intermediary inputs). The
elasticity of substitution between Z1 and Z2 is ρ = 1/(1−δ). Cost-minimization,
with respect to Z1 and Z2 given ﬁrm-speciﬁc prices on input factor k, Pkit, means
solving the problem
minZkit P1itZ1it + P2itZ2it s.t.[
Zδ1it + (b2itZ2it)
δ] 1δ
= y,
(2)
where y denotes the intermediate aggregate. This has the well-known solution
Zkit = yb
ρ
kit
(
Pkit
P
)−ρ
, k = 1, 2 (3)
where P is the price index of the intermediate aggregate:
P =
[
2∑
k=1
(
Pkit
bkit
)γ] 1γ
with γ =
δ
δ − 1 . (4)
The relative demand between input of dirty and clean intermediates is given by
lnZ2it − lnZ1it = ρ ln b2it − ρ ln P2it
P1it
. (5)
We assume that total damage costs of emissions from the use of dirty input is
given by
Dit =
∑
n
antλnitZ2it ≡ κitZ2it, (6)
where ant is the unit price (in Euros) of damage from emissions of component
n and λnit is the emissions (in physical units) of component n from the use of
one unit of dirty input Z2 in ﬁrm i at time t. This implies that there is a linear
relationship between emissions from dirty inputs and the total damage costs. We
can interpret κit as the emission coeﬃcient from the use of dirty input Z2, at time
t measured as damage costs. Inserting equation (6) into equation (5) and taking
logarithms gives the following equation for the damage costs of emissions from
ﬁrm i at time t relative to the use of clean input, Z1:
lnDit − lnZ1it = lnκit + lnZ2it − lnZ1it ⇔
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ln
Dit
Z1it
= git − ρ ln P2it
P1it
, (7)
where git = lnκit + ρ ln (b2it) which will be represented in terms of observed and
unobserved variables to be speciﬁed in Sections 3 and 4. The left hand side of
equation (7) is the damage costs from dirty input relative to the use of clean input
(clean energy input).
We choose this measure of emission intensity as our measure of environmental
performance. Usually an emission intensity is measured as emissions in physical
units divided by the use of the corresponding dirty input, while environmental
performance often is measured as emissions divided by income or production level,
as in the literature of Environmental Kuznets Curves4. Unfortunately, the physical
emission intensity is applicable to the very few factors where we can observe
both physical input and emissions, while emissions divided by deﬂated operating
income will include substitution-, scale- and technology eﬀects, as well as revenue
components that often are volatile. By deﬁning environmental performance as
in equation (7) we are able to control for all these eﬀects. Our measure of clean
intermediary input (the numeraire) is electricity, which until recently mostly has
been supplied by hydroelectricity in Norway, for more details see Section 3. From
equation (7) we see that environmental performance is a function of the relative
price between dirty intermediary input and clean intermediary input, P2it/P1it, the
elasticity of substitution, ρ, and ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects, git, that will be speciﬁed in
Sections 3 and 4. It may not be random to the ﬁrm what kind of regulations that
are implemented by the authorities. This may cause an endogeneity problem. In
order to identify causal eﬀects we diﬀerentiate equation (7) to remove ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects and unit roots. We later show that both ln (Dit/Z1it) and ln (P2it/P1it) are
highly non-stationary time series (at the aggregate level). Hence, diﬀerentiation is
necessary to remove stochastic (unit root) and linear trends in both the dependent
and explanatory variables. Our econometric model in Section 4 is based on the
4 As the economies have become richer support has been found for the existence of an Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve (EKC) which implies an inverse u-shaped relationship between emissions
(even for green house gas emissions, Cole et.al., 2005) and country income (GDP), Andreoni
and Levinson (2001). There are diﬀerent hypotheses for the existence of an EKC, but it is rea-
sonable to believe that the growing environmental political concerns toward regulating polluting
emissions have contributed to this inverse u-shape. The contributions to this u-shaped curve
can be decomposed into substitution eﬀects, technology eﬀects, scale eﬀects etc (Bruvoll and
Medin, 2003; Bruvoll et al., 2003; Bruvoll and Larsen, 2004).
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diﬀerentiated version of equation (7):
4 ln Dit
Z1it
= 4git − ρ4 ln P2it
P1it
(8)
3 Data sources and description of variables
We have obtained our ﬁrm-level panel data from several data sources. All data
sets are merged using organizational number as the ﬁrm identiﬁer. The data
span 20 years, from 1993 to 2012. A key data set comprises the data from the
Norwegian Environment Agency (in the following referred to as NEA) on annual
emissions of more than 260 diﬀerent pollutants emitted to air and water, emission
permits, assigned risk classes, inspections and violations from inspections of all
land-based Norwegian ﬁrms that have emission permits from the NEA. We use
this data set as the basis for our sample selection, as emissions are only reported
for these ﬁrms. All together, this leaves us with 741 ﬁrms and 7209 ﬁrm-year
observations.
The data above are supplemented with annual data from three diﬀerent reg-
isters at Statistics Norway: The Accounts statistics, the Environmental Accounts
and the National Accounts. Hence, our data set also includes ﬁrm level economic
variables, prices of electricity and fossil fuels (that includes energy- and envi-
ronmental taxes), electricity and fossil fuel use measured in kWh, and tradable
carbon emission quotas. A detailed description of the key variables is provided
below, where they are grouped into three main categories: i) Energy and emis-
sions, ii) environmental regulations and iii) control variables. These data allow us
to include several control variables at the ﬁrm level.
3.1 Energy and Emissions
Our dataset from NEA includes emissions of various pollutants ranging from heavy
metals to green house gases. The emissions are measured in a wide range of phys-
ical units and cause diﬀerent types of damages ranging from cancer risks or loss
of fertility to global warming. To study the empirical eﬀects of diﬀerent environ-
mental policies on environmental performance, we need to transform the emissions
data to a common measurement scale. We use shadow prices of damages for each
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kind of emission to calculate total damages in terms of monetary damage costs
(Håndbok V712, 2006; Rosendahl, 2000; de Bruin et al., 2010). Shadow prices
are constructed prices for goods or production factors that are not traded in
markets. Measuring shadow prices of polluting emission is challenging in sev-
eral ways. Firstly, it requires sophisticated methodology and in-depth knowledge
about chemical compounds, as well as the recipients of the environment. Secondly,
it requires simplifying assumptions, that must be transparent and discussed thor-
oughly. Moreover, there are several examples of studies who do not rely on expert
comparisons of damages of various chemical compounds, but rather involve mea-
sures with the naive assumption that one unit of any compound causes the same
damage (!) (Lucas et al., 1992). Obviously, chemical compounds are diﬀerent:
An emission of a kilo of hazardous mercury and a kilo of CO2 cause very diﬀerent
types and degrees of damages.
There is no comprehensive study of damage costs of Norwegian emissions,
but by collecting damage estimates from diﬀerent sources (Håndbok V712, 2006;
Rosendahl, 2000), we are able to establish data for Norwegian damage costs of
many of the emissions. In addition, we use damage costs estimates evaluated
at shadow prices reﬂecting marginal damage of the ﬁrm's annual emissions con-
structed in de Bruin et al. (2010). These damage estimates are averages for the
Netherlands, and as local conditions may vary, we prefer using the Norwegian dam-
age estimates whenever these are available. Especially damages from emissions to
air may diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the Netherlands and Norway due to the con-
siderably smaller population intensity in Norway. de Bruin et al. (2010) provides
an extensive methodology for estimating shadow prices and deriving weighting
factors for individual types of environmental impact. We thus have a scientiﬁc
background for the damage estimates used in this study, and the assumptions are
explicitly detailed and the methodology employed is thoroughly described. This
enables us to obtain a linear approximation for aggregated damage estimates for
all ﬁrm-years by multiplying the annual emission levels in kg with the damage
estimates in ﬁxed 2008 euros/kg. Linear aggregate damage costs may over- or un-
derestimate the true damage costs, depending on whether the observed emissions
in our data are lower or higher than the emission levels the marginal damage costs
were estimated for. Marginal damage costs will often increase with the level of
emissions.
Economic growth has a tendency to increase emissions, while technological
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progress typically will reduce emissions per unit produced.5 We measure environ-
mental performance (the emission intensity) as the estimated damage costs of a
ﬁrm's total annual emissions D, for each ﬁrm-year in ﬁxed 2008 Euros, relative
to the input of clean energy, Z1, which is the ﬁrm's use of electricity measured in
kWh, see Section 2 . This gives our emission intensity measure, (D/Z1). Electricity
amounts to 85 % of ﬁrms' total energy use in Norway, and hydro power has been
the main source of electricity in Norway during the estimation period. Therefore,
we use input of electricity as the clean energy input (numeraire). We have data
on ﬁrm level electricity use from the Energy Statistics. Figure 1 illustrates the
trend in the emission intensity (aggregate damage estimates relative to the use
of electricity in kWh) of three examples of pollutants: particulates, green house
gases and acidiﬁcation and ozone precursers. All three groups of pollutants exibit
a downward trend in emission intensities. Particulates and green house gases have
the largest reductions in emission intensities of 62 and 83 per cent respectively,
whereas the reduction for acidiﬁcation and ozone precursers is 25 per cent.
Figure 2 provides calculated trends for energy use Norwegian on-shore ﬁrms
with emission permits. The left panel (Chart a) illustrates that electricity use has
remained relatively constant over time, with a dip in 2009 of nearly 20 per cent,
following the ﬁnancial crisis (NVE, 2013). The use of petroleum products (except
gas) follows a downward trend since 1997, while the use of gas has more than
doubled over the period. Chart b) displays diﬀerent energy intensity measures.
Measured relative to real income, total energy intensity fell sharply until 2000-
2001, and afterwords increased until 2003, for so falling and reaching a new dip
in 2007-2008, before increasing and then ﬂattening out again. Decomposing the
energy intensity into electricity intensity and gas- and petroleum intensities, we
see that the wobbly path is caused by changes in electricity use, as indicated by the
left panel (Chart a)). The petroleum intensity follows a downward sloping path,
whereas the gas intensity is mostly stable from the year 2000 and onwards. The
use of electricity ﬂuctuates around +/- 10 percent in the time period, so the fall in
the electricity intensity is caused by the increase in real operating income. Hence,
the main driving force behind the improvements in environmental performance
over the period as (see Figures 1 and 6) is related to emission reductions and
5 The literature on Environmental Kuznets Curves (EKC) typically ﬁnds that emissions are
positively correlated with a country's income growth to a certain level, but as the country gets
even richer it will start abating emissions such that the EKC is falling as the country gets even
richer.
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Fig. 1: Monetary values (in ﬁxed 2008 euros) of total estimated damages of Nor-
wegian emissions relative to total electricity use (in kWh). All Norwegian
onshore ﬁrms with emission permits.
not increased electricity use. Our emission intensity measure can be aﬀected
positively by either reducing the numerator (the damage estimates of the emissions
for a given level of clean energy input) or by increasing the denominator (the
input of clean energy). Another relevant measure of emission intensity would
be total environmental damage costs divided by deﬂated operating income (as a
measure of production volume). However, our measure of emission intensity is
more robust towards volatile price- and income eﬀects at the ﬁrm level since it
is measured relative to the volume of electricity measured in kWh. Electricity
use is a particularly good measure of activity level in energy intensive industries
like manufacturing. Chart c) of Figure 2 illustrates the trends in mean operating
income and electricity use. Operating income ﬂuctuates signiﬁcantly more than
electricity use, especially from 2003 until 2010.
3.2 Environmental regulations
A number of environmental regulations have been introduced in Norway over
the last four decades. Non-tradable emission quotas combined with technology
restrictions are administered by the NEA and has existed since 1974. Such reg-
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Fig. 2: Norwegian on-shore ﬁrms with emission permits. Chart a): Firms' total
energy use (kWh). Chart b): Energy use (kWh) relative to real operating
income (using a producer price index as deﬂator) Chart c): Trend in mean
real operating income and electricity use (kWh).
ulations are frequently used when a regulator faces complexities such as multiple
emission types and targets, heterogeneous recipients and uncertainty with regard
to marginal damage. This regulation is typically categorized as a direct policy in-
strument (also referred to as command-and-control). Moreover, Norway is part
of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which regulates
green house gas emissions in the EU and EFTA area (Ministry of Finance, 2013).
Finally, there are several environmental taxes on polluting emissions. These two
latter types of regulation can be categorized as indirect policy instruments (also
referred to as market-based or incentive-based regulations). In the following
we will discuss how the diﬀerent types of regulations can induce changes in pro-
duction and pollution. The main notion is that regulatory costs can come in the
form of prices, which is the case for indirect regulations, or in the form of threats
of sanctions, which is typically the case for direct regulations. Such regulatory
costs, whether in the form of prices or threats of sanctions, will provide incentives
for behavioural change. The diﬀerence between direct and indirect instruments
is thus smaller than what is often perceived. The largest diﬀerence in practice, is
perhaps that direct regulations tend to be a bit more extensive, in the sense that
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the more detailed permits allow the regulator to regulate more dimensions of the
production. Indirect regulations tend to be more ﬂexible. In theory, a tax or a
tradable emission allocation can also take into account many dimensions, such as
the timing or the location of the emission, but in practice it rarely does.
3.2.1 Direct regulations: Non-tradable emission quotas and technology
standards
The dualistic categorization of instruments as either incentive-based or command-
and-control creates the notion that the latter type of regulation does not lead
ﬁrms to face pollution prices or incentives for emission reductions. However, such
regulations involve several regulatory costs providing ﬁrms with incentives for be-
havioural change. These incentives are not fundamentally diﬀerent from those
arising from indirect instruments. Firstly, the NEA can ﬁne non-complying ﬁrms.
Secondly, the NEA has the authority to prosecute the ﬁrm. Thirdly, ﬁrms may
face costs in terms of local stigmatization and bad publicity since data on viola-
tions are publicly available. Lastly, the ﬁrm's permit can be withdrawn, which
will ultimately lead to close-down of production. These regulation costs impose a
limit on the ﬁrms' production activity.
To measure the incentive or the regulatory costs of this form of direct reg-
ulation, we need to identify when the regulation is binding, and how strict the
regulation is (if binding). We follow Klemetsen et al. (2013) and Jaﬀe and Stavins
(1995) in assuming that the incentives for changes in environmental behavior are
related to the possibility (or threat) of being sanctioned for violating a permit.
Rather than using the (excess) level of emission pollutants as a proxy for the
probability of being sanctioned, as in Jaﬀe and Stavins (1995), we use the inspec-
tion violation status of the ﬁrm (this variable is described below). The reason
for our choice is that regulators cannot observe emission levels, but must rely on
self-reported levels. Hence, they tend to focus on technology and institutional vi-
olations when meting out sanctions. A large majority of the ﬁrms that exceed the
permit are never sanctioned. In fact, the correlation between excess emissions and
the Violation status of a ﬁrm is only 0.13. Our measure more accurately reﬂects
the risk that a ﬁrm will be sanctioned unless it takes action to comply.6Another
6 Féres and Reynaud (2012) measure formal regulations as the number of inspections and
average eﬃciency of warnings and ﬁnes of the local environmental agencies. The only ﬁrm level
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possible measure of direct regulations is to simply use the year a speciﬁc technol-
ogy standard is implemented. However, such a measure will be more vulnerable
to heterogeneity issues with respect to timing. Firms are informed about a forth-
coming standard several years in advance. Some ﬁrms adapt to the standard early,
some ﬁrms adapt late, and some ﬁrms make contracts with the NEA, that allow
the ﬁrm to use the old technology for a period of time after the initial deadline.
Determining the appropriate lag stucture of the eﬀect of a technology standard
is thus challenging. Our measure is much less vulnerable to such issues, as an
inspection violation more correctly captures the timing of the regulatory costs.
An important part of the regulatory costs of direct regulation is thus captured by
the Violation status of the ﬁrm (denoted V ). This reﬂects the risk that a ﬁrm
will be sanctioned unless it takes action to reduce its production level or change
technology to reduce emission levels or intensity.
The ﬁrms are subject to regular inspections. If a violation is detected during
an inspection, the ﬁrm receives a letter from the NEA with a warning of sanctions
that will be imposed on the ﬁrm should it stay out of compliance.7 The level
of the sanctions is based on an assessment by the NEA oﬃcer in charge. An
important factor when the regulator considers using sanctions is the severity of the
violation. We have data on inspection violations and the regulator's assessment
of the severity of the inspection violation. The variable is ordinal and have three
values: V = 0 denotes a ﬁrm with no violations, V = 1 denotes minor violations
and V = 2 denotes serious violations. More serious violations involve a higher
risk of being sanctioned. Nyborg and Telle (2006) ﬁnd that the majority of ﬁrms
comply with the regulations after receiving a letter of warning of sanctions. They
conclude that the NEA regulations are generally considered to be binding. Each
ﬁrm with an emission permit is assigned with a risk class8. Since the inspection
variable connected to direct regulations is a dummy variable that describes the license status of
the ﬁrm.
7 When inspecting plants, the NEA focuses on violations of procedures and general mainte-
nance of equipment rather than on actual emissions (Telle, 2004). The complete permits also
contain a variety of qualitative requirements concerning institutional, technological as well as
formal aspects of the plant. The data on the ﬁrms' violations probably provide a good overview
of the compliance with the environmental regulations. Data are also available for violations of
emission quotas based on self-reported emission levels are also available, although we only use
the violation status from the NEA inspections.
8 Risk classes are assigned by the regulator to each ﬁrm with an emission permit. The
assignment of a risk class is based on the strength of the recipient of the emission (e.g. the
vulnerability of a river, its wind and stream conditions, popularity of a recreation area, etc.) and
the emission level. The risk classes vary from 1 to 4, where risk class 1 comprises ﬁrms considered
to be potentially highly environmentally harmful. Firms considered the least dangerous are
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frequency varies across risk classes, it is important to control for risk class.
Our measure of direct regulations, violation status, is likely to capture only
part of the incentive stemming from direct regulations. More speciﬁcally, the
measure will capture most of the incentive for ﬁrms that are struggling to comply.
However, it is likely that many ﬁrms adapt to the technology requirements in
time, and thus avoid non-compliance (violations). An improvement in the envi-
ronmental performance for these ﬁrms that did not follow directly after a violation
may also be an eﬀect of the technology requirement. Hence, our measure of direct
regulations is likely to capture only a part of the full incentive.
3.2.2 Indirect regulations
Environmental taxes
Carbon taxes were introduced to follow up the Norwegian authorities policies
to curb climate gas emissions following the Brundtland commission (UN, 1987).
Later Norway has signed the Kyoto-protocol and made commitments to the EU's
20-20-20 goal for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (see e.g. Climate Cure
2020, 2010). For Norway, CO2 emissions that are not covered by the EU ETS are
mainly covered by the CO2 tax. The CO2 tax was levied on oil and gas from 1991,
and it varies greatly between fossil fuel types and end uses. There are also taxes
on sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions that are regulated
by the Gothenburg protocol, and taxes on emissions of hydro ﬂuorocarbons (HFC)
and per ﬂuorocarbons (PFC) that are regulated by the Montreal treaty. A tax on
the chemicals trichloroethene and tetrachloroethene was introduced in 2000. This
implies that there are several taxes on the consumption of fossil fuel products, but
the tax rates may diﬀer between the industries/ﬁrms and over the data period.
There is also a tax on electricity consumption for some industries/ﬁrms.9
Ideally, we would like to investigate the eﬀect of environmental taxes and
these taxes are mostly levied on energy goods. However, in the data we cannot
separate the energy base price from the emission taxes. In any case, the ﬁrm
placed in risk class 4. A higher risk class (where 1 is the highest) is associated with higher
regulatory costs for the ﬁrm in several ways. They are subject to more frequent and more costly
inspections, and warnings of higher ﬁnes (see Klemetsen et al., 2013).
9 Ministry of Finance (2007) contains a detailed description of energy and environmental
taxation in Norway in recent decades and of the international environmental agreements that
Norway has signed.
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adjusts to the total energy price including taxes, and our proxy for the emission
taxes should capture this appropriate incentive for the ﬁrm. Hence, for each ﬁrm
we calculate energy goods prices. Electricity prices are estimated on ﬁrm level as
expenditures on the use of electricity in (ﬁxed 2008) euros divided by electricity
use in kWh. Dirty energy prices are estimated on ﬁrm level as the the sum of the
ﬁrm's expenditures (in ﬁxed 2008 euros) on the use of petroleum products and
gas relative to the use of petroleum and gas (in kWh).
Figure 3 (Chart a)) shows the development over time in the ﬁrms' mean real
prices of intermediary inputs, i.e., electricity, petroleum products, gas and mate-
rial prices (using a producer price index as deﬂator). Material input factors are
proxied by Production Input Prices (Statistics Norway). Both petroleum, gas and
materials have experienced a real price increase in the period, in spite of some
wobbly periods. Especially real gas prices was considerable higher around 2000.
The real electricity price has increased only sligthly over the period, and drops in
2011.
We study the eﬀects of indirect regulations in the form of relative price respon-
siveness between dirty and clean intermediary inputs on the entire population
of Norwegian ﬁrms' on-shore emissions. We proxy the indirect regulations as the
relative factor input price10 between the ﬁrm's dirty factor input price (cost-share
weighted average of petroleum, gas and material prices) divided by the ﬁrm's
electricity price.11 This variable is illustrated in Chart b) of Figure 3, and shows
an increasing trend in the relative input price (dirty input prices have increased
more than clean energy (electricity) prices over the time period). Variations in
the relative factor input price includes both changes in the input factor market
prices and changes in environmental taxes. Indirect regulations is mostly directed
towards fossil fuels related emissions (SO2, NOx, volatile organic compounds, par-
ticulates, and most green house gases). Since relative energy prices (dirty/clean)
are directed towards energy related emissions, we perform a separate robustness
analysis on the eﬀect of relative input prices on a subsample of the emissions that
are related to energy use (more on this in Section 4).12
10 Using factor input prices as e.g. energy prices as proxies for environmental taxes is common
in the literature, see e.g. Jaﬀe and Stavins (1995).
11 We estimate ﬁrm level electricity, petroleum and gas prices through dividing the annual use
in NOK with the annual use in kWh. Material input factors are proxied by Production Input
Prices from Statistics Norway. Production Input Prices is the only variable that is not at the
ﬁrm level, but rather at a detailed industry level. Firm variation is achieved through the dirty
and clean energy prices.
12 The following pollutants are related to energy use: CH4, CO, CO2, N2O, NMVOC, V OC,
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Fig. 3: Chart a): Mean prices (1993-2012) of electricity, petroleum, gas and ma-
terial (Production Input Prices). Chart b): Relative prices between dirty
intermediary input factors (petroleum, gas and material prices weighted
by their average cost share) and electricity
EU ETS
Norway is part of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which
regulates carbon emissions in the EU and EFTA area.13 The onshore ﬁrms that
are part of the EU ETS receives tradable free quotas. In the pilot period (2005-
2007) 10% of Norwegian ﬁrms' CO2-emissions were included, while in Phase II
(2008-2013) nearly all manufacturing ﬁrms' CO2-emissions were included. For the
period 2008 to 2012 the allocation rules were not harmonised within the EU ETS
and Norway were issuing fewer free quotas (as per cent of total quotas) than the
other countries. The quota price in the EU ETS has fallen substantially from
2008-2012 (from 30 Euro to less than 10 Euro). This is probably a combination
NO2, NOx, S, SO2, SOx. Moreover, the following pollutants are energy use related when they
are emitted into air: AS, C2F6, CD, CF4, CR − 3, CR − 6, CR − TOT , CU , HG, PB, SF6,
ZN .
13 The period 2005-2007 was a pilot ﬁrst phase for EU ETS in EU and Norway, see the EU's
quota directive (Directive 2003/87/EC). The oil and gas industry in Norway was not included in
the ﬁrst phase, but in the second from 2008. The processing industries, except for the aluminum
industry, have been included since 2005.
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Fig. 4: Polluting ﬁrms' mean emission intensity along the vertical axis in both
panels. Firm characteristics along the horizontal axes (grouped in cate-
gories).
of over-allocation of free quotas in the EU and the recession in the aftermath of
the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, and to a lesser extent due to polluting ﬁrms reducing
their emission intensity.
We include as a control variable a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the
ﬁrm is part of the EU ETS in the given year. Our measure of indirect regulations
(relative price of dirty inputs and clean energy) can in theory include the potential
eﬀects from tradable emission quota prices, through energy prices that may be
inﬂuenced by the the quota price. However, as the EU ETS quota prices are very
low the eﬀects on the energy prices should be minor, so the relative prices between
dirty and clean inputs capture the eﬀects of environmental taxes (which are in fact
included in our observed relative input prices). By including the EU ETS dummy
as a control variable we separate the (potential) eﬀect of the environmental taxes
from the eﬀects of the tradable EU ETS quotas  although they are probably very
small.
3.3 Other explanatory variables
Figure 4 shows that some ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics are highly correlated with
emission intensity and should be included as control variables when analysing
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Fig. 5: Mean ﬁrm-year emission intensity per industry. Emission intensity is de-
ﬁned as the estimated damage costs (in ﬁxed 2008 euros) of the ﬁrm's
emissions per electricity use (in kWh)
environmental performance. In contrast to studies at the industry level, we are
able to take into account both observed and unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity, and
thereby reduce the problem of omitted variable bias in our analysis. Panel a) il-
lustrates how emission intensity decreases with ﬁrm size measured as the number
of employees. This relation could be due to scale advantages as larger ﬁrms may
have more eﬃcient production. In absolute numbers, emission levels are likely to
increase with ﬁrm size, but larger ﬁrms tend to be more emission eﬃcient. More-
over, capital intensity  measured as the capital stock relative to the number of
employees  and emission intensity are positively related as illustrated in Panel b).
More capital intensive ﬁrms may depend more on polluting energy and material
inputs. In addition to the aforementioned control variables we include risk class
dummies (see Section 3.2.1 for details) of the ﬁrm, as well as year- and industry
dummies as control variables to account for common trends and industry speciﬁc
eﬀects.
To control for trends in emissions at the industry level is vital, since common
trends and industry speciﬁc eﬀects are likely to be present. The importance of
this is illustrated in Figure 5 which shows that emission intensity diﬀers systemat-
ically across industries, and in Figure 6 which shows that both energy related and
non-energy related emission intensities, after increasing in the mid-1990s, follow a
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Fig. 6: Mean ﬁrm-year emission intensity over time. Emission intensity is deﬁned
as the estimated damage costs (in ﬁxed 2008 euros) of the ﬁrm's emissions
divided by electricity use (in kWh).
decreasing trend over time. The reduction is most pronounced for emissions from
non-energy related inputs. The diﬀerences in the paths for the two emission inten-
sities illustrates the importance of including all types of emissions in the measure
of emission intensity when analysing eﬀects of diﬀerent kinds of regulations, cf.
also the Introduction. Industry and year eﬀects are included in all estimations.
The industry aggregation is illustrated in Table 2.
3.4 Summary statistics
Our initial sample of 741 incorporated Norwegian onshore ﬁrms with emission
permits contains 7209 ﬁrm-year observations over the years 1993 to 2012. Table
1 contains summary statistics for our initial sample of Norwegian on-shore ﬁrms
with emission permits in the given time period. All variables contain ﬁrm level
variation.
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Norwegian onshore ﬁrms with emission permits in 1993-2012
Variable Obs Mean 25% Perc Median 75% Perc Min Max
Response variable
Environmental performance1 (D/Z1) 5002 88.1 .07 2.4 14.7 0 40415
Explanatory variables
Relative input prices2 (P2/P1) 4053 3.2 .81 1 1.2 .1 4
Violation status3 (V ) 7209 .45 0 0 1 0 2
Control variables
EU ETS dummy4 7209 .05 0 0 0 0 1
Number of employees 5872 267 22 78 225 0 20114
Capital intensity 5595 2017 176 434 1065 0 235161
Dummy for
Rt = 1 7209 .12 0 0 0 0 1
Rt = 2 7209 .23 0 0 0 0 1
Rt = 3 7209 .44 0 0 1 0 1
Rt = 4 7209 .16 0 0 0 0 1
1Real monetary value of ﬁrm damage costs (in ﬁxed 2008-euros) of emissions relative to electricity use (kWh)
2Measure of indirect regulation, dirty intermediary input (weighted average of energy and material) prices
relative to clean energy price
3Measure of technology standards and non-tradable emission quotas (see Section 3.2.1)
4Measure of EU ETS regulation, equal to 1 if regulated by EU ETS
Table 2 provides the industry distribution of the sample in the given time
period. A majority of the polluting ﬁrms are in the manufacturing industries.
Table 2: Distribution across industries of ﬁrm-years 1993-2012
Industry Obs. (ﬁrm-years) Share of obs.
Primary 419 5.8 %
Mining and extraction (excl. oil and gas) 605 8.4 %
Oil and gas extraction 108 1.5 %
Manufacturing (textiles, food) 1392 19.3 %
Manufacturing (wood, pulp, paper) 495 6.9 %
Manufacturing (chem., pharmac., rubber, plastic) 1034 14.3 %
Manufacturing (metals, minerals) 1320 18.3 %
Manufacturing (machinery, electronics) 713 9.9 %
Power production and recycling 572 7.9 %
Transport 56 0.8 %
Construction 50 0.7 %
Retail trade 239 3.3 %
Services 460 6.4 %
Sum 7209 100%
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4 Econometric model, estimation and results
4.1 Econometric model
Our study investigates the impacts on environmental performance of diﬀerent
types of emission regulations. In Section 2 we presented the theoretical model for
producer behaviour and derived an expression of environmental performance as
an emission intensity measured as the total damage costs of the emissions from all
intermediary inputs relative to the use of clean energy input (equation (7)), and
in diﬀerentiated form in equation (8). Environmental taxes (indirect regulations)
aﬀect the relative prices of the input factors (see Section 3.2.2). A change in the
relative prices of input factors provides incentives to substitute inputs towards
the relatively less expensive input factor. Hence, if the dirty intermediary inputs
become more expensive relative to clean energy, our economic model predicts that
ﬁrms will respond by lowering the use of the dirty input factor. A reduction in the
use of dirty input factors will then reduce the emission intensity. Similarly, direct
regulations can provide ﬁrms with incentives to reduce emission intensity through
implicit costs associated with an increased probability of being sanctioned. Hence,
there are potential incentives for emission intensity reductions stemming from
both direct and indirect regulations. We set up the main econometric model
based on equation (8) in Section 2:
4 ln
(
D
Z1
)∗
it
= αt + ρ · 4 ln
(
P2
P1
)
i,t
+ pi · Vi,t−1 + β · 4Xi,t−1 +4εt (9)
D is total damage costs for ﬁrm i. The calculations of the damage costs are
presented in Section 3.1. P2/P1 is the relative input factor price between dirty in-
termediary input, Z2 (polluting energy and materials), and clean input, Z1 (clean
energy which is electricity). This relative input price includes environmental taxes.
Section 3.2.2 provides more details on the calculations of this relative price in-
dex, which is our measure of indirect regulations. Direct regulations (technology
restrictions and non-tradable emission quotas) is measured through the ordinal
variable Violation status (V ) representing the implicit costs of violating a binding
permit (included in the term git in the theoretical model in Section 2). This mea-
sure of direct regulations is in line with Klemetsen et al. (2013). V is thus a proxy
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for a binding constraint that gives incentives for emission reductions.14 In order
to make sure that we are not simply capturing the dirtier and hence more heavily
inspected ﬁrms, we control for the risk class of the ﬁrm through risk class dummies
(see Section 3.2.1). These dummies are likely to capture the diﬀering numbers
of inspections of the ﬁrm, how close the ﬁrm is to a vulnerable area, and ﬁnally,
how much the ﬁrms pollute. Hence, this control variable is likely to capture some
of the incentives for emission reductions, and thus lead to underestimation of the
true eﬀect of direct regulations on environmental performance.
We also include control variables, represented by the vector X (see the data
description in Section 3.3) that may inﬂuence environmental performance: capital
intensity, number of employees, and whether the ﬁrm is part of the EU ETS -
represented by a dummy variable for the relevant years (see Section 3.2.2 on why
this is included as a control variable, even if the EU ETS is an example of an
indirect regulation). Finally, 4ε is the diﬀerentiated error term, which we allow
to have an auto regressive structure of order 1. This is realistic since potential
omitted variables captured in the error term are likely to be correlated within a
given ﬁrm.
In equation (9), ρ reﬂects the average eﬀect from indirect regulations repre-
sented by relative input factor prices, pi reﬂects the average eﬀect from direct
regulations, and β represents a vector of coeﬃcients for the control variables. We
consider relative factor input prices to be exogenous to the ﬁrms. The other ex-
planatory variables are lagged one year to deal with potential issues of reversed
causality and to allow the ﬁrms to adapt to the regulation.
We estimate equation (9) as a mixed model where the coeﬃcients of ln (P2/P1)i,t
and Vi,t−1 are ﬁrm-speciﬁc. The ρ and pi in equation (9) are the average value
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc ρi and pii parameters, respectively. Thus we allow ﬁrms to have
heterogenous responses to environmental regulations. It is essential to allow for
heterogenous treatment eﬀects as ﬁrms may have diﬀerent price elasticities, and
14 Even if all other variables are diﬀerentiated, Vi,t−1 is a level variable measured relative to
0. A violation is in itself a change from steady state as the ﬁrm will at some point return to
a complying state. We include V as a level variable because we want to test the hypothesis
that the ﬁrms' response to violations may have a persistent long term eﬀect on environmental
performance. That is, even if the violation ceases, the eﬀect on environmental performance is
not reversed. If V was included only through 4V we would assume that the regulation did
not have a persistent eﬀect (i.e., that the eﬀect of the regulation was zero/oﬀset over time).
However, this is rather what we want to test. We do so in Section 4.4 by testing if a positive
4V leads to the same eﬀect as a negative 4V (a test of symmetry). The results from this test
support that our speciﬁcation of V at level form in equation (9) is valid.
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thus respond diﬀerently to relative price changes. Moreover, ﬁrms may respond
diﬀerently to inspection violations. E.g., one can imagine some (well-behaved)
ﬁrms that purchase the required technology in time, other ﬁrms that do so when a
violation is detected, and some (bad-behaved) ﬁrms who purchase the required
technology when the regulator detetcs and classiﬁes the violation as a serious one.
The mixed model speciﬁcation estimates the average coeﬃcient estimates (treat-
ment eﬀects). We do not allow for random coeﬃcients in the control variables in
X, because these are of secondary interest.
The results of the estimation of the main speciﬁcation (equation (9)) are given
in Table 3, alternative (I). We also perform this analysis on an alternative sam-
ple, where we only include the energy related emissions in the response variable,
4 ln (D/Z1), denoted alternative (II) in Table 3. This could potentially be of im-
portance for estimating the eﬀect of indirect regulations, as these turn out to be
directed mainly towards energy related emissions. With the sample in alternative
(II) it is thus more likely to identify the causal eﬀects from indirect regulations. In
Section 4.2 we have restricted the measure of direct regulations  Violation status
 to be linear. This assumption is strong. In Section 4.3 we test this assumption
by allowing the eﬀect to be non-linear (Table 4). In Section 4.4 we present the
tests and results (Tables 5 and 6) from the analysis of persistent eﬀects of the
regulations.
4.2 Results of main speciﬁcation
The results of the estimations are given in Table 3. If the response variable,
emission intensity, increases, the ﬁrm becomes less eﬃcient according to our per-
formance measure. If environmental taxes through increased relative input price
create incentives for emission intensity reductions, we expect the estimated co-
eﬃcients on ln (PD/P1) to be negative. Alternative (I) shows that this is indeed
the case for the estimated coeﬃcient with an estimate of ρ equal to -0.10. The
estimated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant well below the 10 % level. This eﬀect can be
interpreted as an elasticity: A 1% increase in the relative price leads to a 0.1%
improvement in the emission intensity.
If the measure of direct regulation, V , increases, the ﬁrm is assumed to ex-
perience the regulation as stricter (see Section 3.2.1). Hence, if this creates an
incentive for reducing the emission intensity, we expect a negative sign on the
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estimated coeﬃcient of this variable. The results show that this is the case, as
the estimated coeﬃcient is -0.08 and the result is signiﬁcant at the 5 % level. The
interpretation is that direct regulations also improve ﬁrms' environmental perfor-
mance. The estimated coeﬃcient of Violation status (direct regulation) is smaller
than the estimated coeﬃcient of the relative energy prices (indirect regulation). It
would, however, be wrong to interpret this result as if indirect regulations have a
larger inﬂuence on environmental performance than direct regulations. We cannot
compare the estimated coeﬃcients directly, as the measure of direct regulations
is an ordinal variable. In addition, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1, our measure
of direct regulations  Violation status  will likely not capture the entire eﬀect
from this policy, as many ﬁrms are likely to adapt not only after a violation is
detected, but adapt when they are required to, thus avoiding non-compliance.
The dummy variable for risk class 1 is omitted because there is no within-
ﬁrm variation (the NEA seldom makes changes in the risk class categorization
of ﬁrms). The estimated coeﬃcients for risk class 2 is higher than for risk class
3 as expected as a change to a higher risk class means that the ﬁrm is now
considered by the NEA to be more pollutive (or close to an area that is now
considered more vulnerable). The estimated eﬀect of capital intensity is positive
(0.09) and signiﬁcant at the 10 % level. Hence, more capital intensive ﬁrms seem
in general to be more dependent on dirty factor inputs. The number of employees
has a negative estimated coeﬃcient, which is signiﬁcant at the 10 % level. This
indicates that there are some positive scale eﬀects, so that larger ﬁrms may have
more eﬃcient technology. The estimated coeﬃcient of the EU ETS dummy is
negative but not signiﬁcant. This variable is only used as a control variable, even
if it is an example of an indirect regulation. The main reason is that the sample
is too small to estimate a causal eﬀect from EU ETS. The estimated coeﬃcient
of the auto-regressive part of the diﬀerentiated error term is negative and highly
signiﬁcant as is typically the case with error terms in diﬀerences.
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Table 3: Results of main speciﬁcation
I II1
Explanatory variables: Coef. Est. St.E. Est. St.E.
4Log of relative input prices2 ρ -.10* .06 -.14** .06
Violation status3 pi -.08** .04 -.05 .04
Control variables β
Risk class dummies4
4D (Risk class = 1) omitted
4D (Risk class = 2) 3.91*** 1.40 -1.32 1.94
4D (Risk class = 3) 2.76*** .89 .69 1.36
4Log of capital intensity .09* .05 -.11* .06
4Log of number of employees -.09* .06 .01 .04
EU ETS dummy -.13 .15 -.17 .15
Constant α .10 .14 -.03 .13
AR(1) coeﬃcient (4εit) φ -.33*** .03 -.16*** .03
Equation (9) (9)
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 3087 2100
Number of ﬁrms 421 273
NOTE: Full set of diﬀerentiated industry and year dummies included but not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
1The response variable, 4 lnD/Z1, only includes a sub-group of energy related emissions
See Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1 for details.
2A measure of indirect regulation: Prices of dirty input factors (weighted average
of energy and material prices) relative to clean energy price.
3A measure of the direct regulation of non-tradable quotas and technology standards.
4The reference category consists of ﬁrms in risk class 4. Risk class 1 is the strictest.
Direct regulations are typically directed towards a wide range of emissions.
Indirect regulations, on the other hand, turn out to be mostly directed towards
energy related emissions (stemming from the use of so-called dirty energy goods
as e.g., fossil fuels). To check the robustness of the estimation results we thus
estimate the model for the subgroup of energy related emissions (i.e., D now
contains only damages from emissions that are related to energy use). This sub-
sample may allow us to better identify the eﬀects from indirect regulations.
Alternative (II) (in Table 3) reports the results from the estimation using only
the sub-sample of energy related emissions. Compared to the main speciﬁcation,
the sample size is reduced from 3187 to 2100, thus some drop in signiﬁcance levels
is expected. This sample is, however, slightly preferred for estimating the eﬀects
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of indirect regulations. The positive results with respect to indirect regulations on
environmental performance are strengthened. This is expected, since we now only
include the types of emission that are typically taxed (energy related emissions).
The estimated coeﬃcient on relative input prices now becomes -0.14 which is
signiﬁcant at the 5 % level. On the other hand, direct regulations are generally
directed towards other types of emissions than energy related ones. Therefore the
drop in the estimated coeﬃcient of Violation status to -0.05 as well as the loss of
signiﬁcance in alternative (II) is expected, since few of the included emissions are
now subjected to direct regulations. Alternative (I) thus provides the preferred
sample selection for investigating the eﬀects of direct regulations.
The estimated coeﬃcient of the control variable capital intensity changes sign
(-0.11) in alternative (II). This subsample of ﬁrms may have machinery that uses
less dirty input than the average ﬁrm in the total sample. Firms in this subsample
thus become less polluting when the capital intensity increases. In alternative (II),
we can no longer detect any scale eﬀects, as the signiﬁcance level has dropped. A
plausible explanation is that the ﬁrms in this sub-sample are quite larger. When
the entire sample of emissions are included, the estimated AR-coeﬃcient of the
error term is estimated to -0.33, whereas it is halved in absolute value when the
sample consists only of energy related emissions.
4.3 Robustness check: Allowing Violation status to have
non-linear eﬀects
In our main speciﬁcation (equation (9)) we have assumed linear eﬀects from the
measure of direct regulation, Violation status. This assumption might not hold.
In this robustness analysis we investigate the eﬀects of the regulations on environ-
mental performance when Violation status is included through dummy variables.
That is, instead of the variable V ∈ [0, 1, 2] we now have included dummies for
V = 1 (denoted by V1) and V = 2 (denoted by V2). The reference category is no
violations (V = 0).
4 ln
(
D
Z1
)∗
it
= αt + ρ·4 ln
(
P2
P1
)
i,t
+ pi1·V1,t−1+ pi2·V2,t−1 + β·4Xi,t−1+4εt (10)
Table 4 provides the results of the speciﬁcation in equation (10) where the
linear assumption of Violation status is dropped. The estimated coeﬃcient of the
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dummy variable for a minor violation is now -0.10, signiﬁcant at the 10 % level,
and the estimated coeﬃcient of the dummy variable reﬂecting a serious violation
is -0.18, which is signiﬁcant at the 5 % level. The coeﬃcients are monotonically
increasing as expected (with the highest incentive for environmental improvements
occurring when the ﬁrm is detected with a serious violation, i.e. having the highest
probability of being sanctioned). The results for the main model in Table 3 are
thus conﬁrmed. The remaining estimates in Table 4 are almost identical to those
of alternative (I) in Table 3.
Table 4: Results when V is represented through dummy variables
Explanatory variables: Coef. Est. St.E.
4Log of relative input prices1 ρ -.10* .06
Violation status dummies2
Violation status = 1 pi1 -.10* .06
Violation status = 2 pi2 -.18** .09
Control variables β
Risk class dummies3
4D (Risk class = 1) omitted
4D (Risk class = 2) 3.91*** 1.40
4D (Risk class = 3) 2.76*** .89
4Log of capital intensity .09* .05
4Log of number of employees -.06* .04
EU ETS dummy -.13 .15
Constant α .10 .15
AR(1) coeﬃcient (4εit) φ -.35*** .04
Equation (10)
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 3087
Number of ﬁrms 421
NOTE: Full set of diﬀerentiated industry and year dummies included but not reported
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
1A measure of indirect regulation: Prices of dirty input factors (weighted average
of energy and material prices) relative to clean energy price.
2A measure of the direct regulation of non-tradable quotas and technology standards.
3The reference category consists of ﬁrms in risk class 4. Risk class 1 is the strictest.
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4.4 Persistent (long term) eﬀects
Finally, we test the notion from literature that indirect regulations promote con-
tinuous dynamic incentives (leading to persistent eﬀects) for emission reductions,
in contrast to direct regulations (OECD, 2001; Jaﬀe and Stavins, 1995; Perman et
al., 2011). If the regulations is relaxed the improvement in environmental perfor-
mance of the regulation may be oﬀset over time. If the improvement is not oﬀset
when the regulation is relaxed, there are persistent eﬀects of the regulation. We
test whether there are such persistent eﬀects by performing a test of asymmetric
responses of stricter and more lax regulations, respectively.15
Firms can respond diﬀerently to stricter regulations. They can purchase or
develop new technology (which is likely to lead to persistent eﬀects as technology
shifts are irreversible  at least in the short run), or they can adjust their produc-
tion activity and substitute clean for dirty input factors (temporary adaptations).
We look for persistent eﬀects by testing whether stricter regulations and more
lax regulations have asymmetric eﬀects on environmental performance. Persis-
tent eﬀects are proven to exist if stricter regulations makes the ﬁrm adapt (by e.g.
purchasing new and cleaner technology) and that this adaptation is not reversed if
the regulation becomes more lax. On the other hand, if the regulation only makes
the ﬁrm adapt by e.g. adjusting the production activity through factor substi-
tution, it is likely that the eﬀect of a stricter regulation ceases if the regulation
is reversed. We can compare the eﬀect of stricter indirect regulations (increased
environmental taxes) or stricter direct regulations (increased probability of be-
ing sanctioned measured through Violation status) with the eﬀect of more lax
regulations. If stricter regulations lead the ﬁrm to improve their environmental
performance, and a more lax regulation do not completely nullify this eﬀect, it
implies that there is a persistent eﬀect of the regulation. Formally, this test is a
test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coeﬃcients corresponding, respectively,
to positive and negative changes in the measures of regulatory stringency (rela-
tive prices and violation status) is zero over time. Symmetric responses to stricter
15 We have tested how long it takes until the regulation has full eﬀect by including lagged
versions of each regulation variable. By starting backwards and removing insigniﬁcant lags until
rejection, we ﬁnd that both types of regulation on average takes two years to reach full eﬀect.
The sum of the eﬀects of indirect regulations over two years is found to be 0.22 (that the sum
of the estimated coeﬃcients is zero can be rejected at the 5% level). The estimated full eﬀect of
direct regulations is 0.20 (signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 % level). Omitting lags of the
explanatory variables means that our estimated (main) model speciﬁcations can be interpreted
as long-run (steady-state) relations between dependent and independent variables.
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and more lax regulations imply that a decrease in emissions from intermediary
inputs over time (a decreasing trend) can only be achieved by continously en-
forcing stricter direct regulations or increases in the relative factor price (indirect
regulations). We will come back to this when discussing the results. Our ﬁrst
step is to estimate the equation:
4 ln
(
D
Z1
)∗
it
= αt + ρ
+ ·D
(
4 ln P2
P1
> 0
)
·4 ln P2
P1
+ ρ− ·D
(
4 ln P2
P1
< 0
)
·4 ln P2
P1
+ pi+ ·D (4Vt−1 > 0) ·Vt−1 + pi− ·D (4Vt−1 < 0) ·Vt−1+ β ·4Xi,t−1+4εt (11)
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Table 5: Results of dynamic speciﬁcation (persistent eﬀects)
Explanatory variables: Coef. Est. St.E.
4Log of relative input prices1
4Log of relative input prices: 4 > 0 ρ+ -.12* .07
4Log of relative input prices: 4 < 0 ρ− -.11* .07
Violation status2
4Violation status:4 > 0 pi+ -.15** .07
4Violation status:4 < 0 pi− .03 .04
Control variables β
Risk class dummies3
4D (Risk class = 1) omitted
4D (Risk class = 2) 3.88*** 1.33
4D (Risk class = 3) 2.70*** .89
4Log of capital intensity .11 .07
4Log of number of employees -.06 .13
EU ETS dummy -.13 .26
Constant α .07 .16
AR(1) coeﬃcient (4εit) φ -.34*** .02
Equation (11)
Number of ﬁrm-year observations 2734
Number of ﬁrms 384
NOTE: Full set of diﬀerentiated industry and year dummies included but not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
1A measure of indirect regulation: Prices of dirty input factors (weighted average
of energy and material prices) relative to clean energy price.
2A measure of the direct regulation of non-tradable quotas and technology standards.
3The reference category consists of ﬁrms in risk class 4. Risk class 1 is the strictest.
We want to test the long-term eﬀects of a temporary change in V and ln (P2/P1).
That is, 4Vt = −4Vt+1 and 4 ln (P2/P1)t = −4 ln (P2/P1)t+1. If this is the case,
an increase (decrease) in the regulatory measure in year t is reversed in year t+1
(e.g. Vt−1 = 0,Vt = 1, Vt+1 = 0; or ln (P2/P1)t+1 = ln (P2/P1)t−1). The long-term
eﬀect on ln (D/Z1)t is zero if 4 ln (D/Z1)t +4 ln (D/Z1)t+1 = 0, which is equivalent
to symmetric eﬀects from stricter and more lax regulations: i) ρ+ − ρ− = 0 and
ii) pi+ − pi− = 0.
The results of Table 5 imply that there might be persistent eﬀects from direct
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regulations. The estimated eﬀect of an increase in the probability of being sanc-
tioned (4V = 1) has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the emission intensity,
whereas when this regulatory enforcement vanishes (4V = −1), the estimated
eﬀect is not reversed (as the estimated coeﬃcient is even positive). The estimated
eﬀect of indirect regulations, however, seem to be symmetric. An increase in
relative factor price provides only a slightly greater eﬀect on emission intensity
compared to the reversed eﬀect from a decrease in relative factor price. We inves-
tigate this further by testing the null hypothesis if the sum of the eﬀect of stricter
and the eﬀect from more lax regulations is equal to zero. This is equivalent to a
test of the long-term eﬀects of a temporary change in V and in ln (P2/P1). That
is, we test the hypotheses i) and ii) above.
Table 6: Tests of signiﬁcance of long-term coeﬃcients
Long term coeﬃcient Estimate H0 p-value
ρ+ − ρ− -.01 ρ+ − ρ− = 0 .9230
pi+ − pi− -.18 pi+ − pi− = 0 .0664
From Table 6, we see that the null-hypothesis of no persistent eﬀects in direct
regulations (i.e., that the estimated eﬀect of 4Vt = 1 and 4Vt = −1 ), can be
rejected well within the 10 % signiﬁcance level (p-value 0.064). Direct regulations
thus promote continuous dynamic incentives that leads to persistent eﬀects on
the emission intensity. Firms respond to direct regulations by making technology
changes that are irreversible. This result contradicts the notion from literature
(OECD, 2001; Jaﬀe and Stavins, 2005; Perman et al., 2011) that direct regulations
do not promote continuous dynamic incentives. The result is not unexpected as
ﬁrms who are exposed to direct regulations are still incentivized to minimize the
costs of achieving a given level of pollution (i.e., even if the quota is ﬁxed). Also,
technology standards typically require ﬁrms to either use a speciﬁc Best Available
Technology (BAT), or prohibit a speciﬁc dirty type of technology. For the ﬁrms
such regulations may imply a high implicit (or shadow) cost of emissions giving
incentives to technological change and emissions reductions as conﬁrmed by our
data. Technology standards are in theory considered to provide little incentives
for innovation (see e.g. Johnstone et al., 2010). However, ﬁrms may see it as
proﬁtable to develop the technology that is deﬁned as the BAT as this may have
a large market value (Perman et al., 2011; Klemetsen et al., 2013). Other strategic
concerns may also enter.
Moreover, we see that the null-hypothesis of no persistent eﬀects of indirect
regulations (i.e., that the estimated eﬀect of increased relative input price minus
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the estimated eﬀect of an equally decreased relative input price) cannot be re-
jected. This result implies that a temporary stricter regulation will not have a
persistent eﬀect as the ﬁrms would simply substitute back to the initial factor
input combinations when the relative input price decreased. However, Chart b)
of Figure 3 illustrates a positive trend in relative intermediary input price, and
hence we cannot exclude persistent (long-term) eﬀects of indirect regulations. The
policy implication is that indirect regulations (in Norway during the estimation
period) only have potential persistent (long-term) eﬀects on emission intensity
if environmental taxes are increasing over time. If the positive trend in relative
intermediary input price is reversed, there will be no persistent eﬀect of indirect
regulations. Therefore, constant and/or increasing environmental taxes are nec-
essary for tax instruments to create continuous dynamic incentives. This result
is in line with the literature on e.g. optimal carbon tax paths when induced
technological change is present, see e.g. Goulder and Mathai (2000).
With regard to the estimated coeﬃcients of the control variables (Table 5),
they are not very diﬀerent from alternative (I) in Table 3. However, we see that
the signiﬁcance levels of log of capital intensity, log of number of employees and
the EU ETS dummy have dropped.
5 Conclusions
Conventional economic theory predicts two main advantages of indirect regula-
tions over direct regulations. Firstly, indirect regulations minimize the aggregate
cost of achieving a given level of environmental protection. Secondly, indirect reg-
ulations promote continuous dynamic incentives that lead to persistent eﬀects
on emissions through technological improvement, in contrast to direct regula-
tions. Studies typically focus on the evaluation criteria economic eﬃciency and
cost-eﬀectiveness. However, no single policy instrument ranks ﬁrst among all the
dimensions of policy comparison (Palmer, 1980; Goulder and Parry, 2008; Perman
et.al., 2011; Wiener, 1999). Each instrument has its strength and weaknesses. In
this paper we investigate the eﬀects on environmental performance measured as
an emission intensity of the two types of environmental regulations, and especially
investigate whether there are any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the eﬀects of di-
rect and indirect regulations. In particular, we test whether indirect regulations
promote continuous dynamic incentives leading to persistent eﬀectson emissions
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through technological improvements, in contrast to direct regulations, as the lit-
erature suggests. Our ﬁrm-level data set allows us to analyze the eﬀects from
diﬀerent types of regulations such as environmental taxes, non-tradable emission
quotas and technology standards. The ﬁrm level panel data set spanning over the
years 1993-2012 includes information about diﬀerent types of environmental regu-
lations, the entire population of Norwegian ﬁrms' land based pollutant emissions,
and a large number of control variables for all polluting Norwegian incorporated
ﬁrms. We are thus able to conduct a comprehensive study of the eﬀect of vari-
ous environmental regulations on our measure of environmental performance that
includes all types of emissions.
Our results showe that the dualistic categorization of the instruments as ei-
ther incentive-based or command-and-control is overly simplistic. We identify
a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of non-tradable emission quotas and technology
restrictions on environmental performance as in line with Cole et al. (2005) and
Féres and Reynaud (2012)  among others. Moreover, we ﬁnd positive and sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects of environmental taxes proxied by the relative price between dirty
and clean input factors. However, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms respond symmetrically to
increases and decreases in the relative intermediary input price. Hence, constant
and/or increasing environmental taxes are necessary if tax instruments are to
create persistent eﬀects on environmental performance. In Norway during the
estimation period there has been a positive time trend in the relative factor input
price between dirty intermediary input and clean energy input. Thus we cannot
exclude the possibility of persistent eﬀects of indirect regulations. Finally, we ﬁnd
evidence that direct regulations promote continuous dynamic incentives leading
to persistent eﬀects, in contrast to former beliefs (OECD, 2001; Jaﬀe and Stavins,
1995; Perman et al., 2011). Non-tradable quotas may, even if the quota is ﬁxed,
create an incentive for the ﬁrm to reach this level at the lowest cost by reorganiz-
ing the production process, or investing in new technologies. Moreover, ﬁrms can
realize the scope for commercializing a cheaper and more eﬃcient technology given
the likely increased demand and the lucrative possibility of patenting a BAT tech-
nology which is likely to generate large future income for the ﬁrm (Perman et al.,
2011; Klemetsen et al., 2013). There are considerable uncertainties regarding the
development of future clean technologies and the BAT, and ﬁrms facing indirect
regulations may want to postpone technology shifts due to this uncertainty (see
e.g. Reinelt and Keith, 2007). Direct regulations promote transparent signals to
the ﬁrms, reducing the risk of new technology investments. Finally, ﬁrms can be
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motivated by considerations of pre-emptiveness16 anticipating that the regulation
is likely to become more stringent over time.
As far as environmental performance improvements are at aim for environmen-
tal regulations, or if cost eﬃciency is diﬃcult to obtain, there is no reason to prefer
one type of regulation over another. Hence, we may still use direct regulations
when the conditions for these regulations are better.
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